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"The most awful problem that any nation ever undertook to solve":
Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship
Abstract
Reconstruction is the step-child of the Civil War, the black hole of American history. It lacks the conflict and
the personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the climactic feuds and battles, and
dissipates into a confusing and wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories, and embarrassing
defeats whose ultimate endpoint is the great American disgrace - Jim Crow. It lives with the short end of the
historical stick for accomplishing too much, then accomplishing too little, with the result that almost the worst
thing that can be said about someone in American history is that they were prominent in Reconstruction,
since it throws them into the same mental filing cabinet with Andrew Johnson, Ulysses Grant and the Ku Klux
Klan. Its twelve years, from 1865 to 1877, teem with associations and developments that seem regrettable, it
not absolutely subversive:
1. The first massive intrusion of federal governmental authority in the affairs of individuals and the states,
beginning with the first and second Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which effectively reduced all but one of the
states of the defeated Confederacy to the status of conquered provinces and imposed military occupation of
those states until the civil populations re-wrote their state constitutions in a way that satisfied Congress
2. The first expansion of the category of civil rights recognized and enforced by the federal government, and
the first limits on other civil rights (free assembly, legislative independence, freedom of the press) since the
Alien and Sedition Acts
3. Massive and wholesale graft, corruption and fraud in the civil governments erected by federal force in the
rebel states
4. The insertion of race as a political consideration into federal politics, by treating blacks as a "distinct class" to
be protected and assisted.
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SUMMARY: 
 ... Can democracy endure alongside slavery?  ... The other two discuss the jurisdiction of the federal courts over "Con-
troversies... between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects," and the "Privi-
leges and Immunities" which "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to" enjoy equally with all those of "Citizens in 
the several States." ... So, from the moment it became clear that Andrew Johnson intended nothing more than the 
re-creation of the pre-war status quo, minus only slavery, the Republican congressional leadership - Thaddeus Stevens 
of Pennsylvania in the House, Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts in the Senate - reached over John-
son's hands, first to replace the old Confederate order with a free-labor economy, and then to define citizenship in such a 
way as to secure the freedmen's place within the politics and economy of a new South.  ... The "Black Codes" enacted 
in the wake of Johnson's amnesty proclamation were aimed at defining blacks as "vagrants' or "paupers' who could be 
excluded from citizenship by excessive poll taxes, forbidding black-white intermarriage, curtailments of free speech 
(including "insulting gestures"), and most ominous of all, ownership of "fire-arms of any kind, or any ammunition, dirk 
or bowie knife." ... The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a landmark in the expansion of the notion of federal citizenship, 
because it forced into the open for the first time since the Constitutional Convention the inherently problematic linkage 
of the divided sovereignty of the states and the Union, and the divided tracks of a citizenship of status and a citizenship 
of participation.  ... Fearful that "the first time that the South with their copperhead allies obtained command of Con-
gress," they would repeal the civil rights bill and appeal to the Court to overturn the Reconstruction Acts, congressional 
Republicans leapt ahead in the second session of the 39th Congress to armor-plate the status of federal citizenship with 
two amendments to the Constitution, the fourteenth (which eliminated any distinction between state and federal citizen-
ship and welded them together on the basis of jus soli: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside" ) and the fifteenth in 
1869 (which annexed participation to federal citizenship by preventing any state or federal authority from denying the 
right to vote on account "of race, color, or previous condition of servitude").  ... Hence, the "privileges and immunities" 
attached to federal citizenship had no application to state governments. 
 
 TEXT: 
Reconstruction is the step-child of the Civil War, the black hole of American history. It lacks the conflict and the 
personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the climactic feuds and battles, and dissipates into a con-
fusing and wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories, and embarrassing defeats whose ultimate endpoint is 
the great American disgrace - Jim Crow. n1 It lives with the short end of the historical stick for accomplishing too much, 
then accomplishing too little, with the result that almost the worst thing that can be said about someone in American 
history is that they were prominent in Reconstruction, since it throws them into the same mental filing cabinet with An-
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drew Johnson, Ulysses Grant and the Ku Klux Klan. n2 Its twelve years, from 1865 to 1877, teem with associations and 
developments that seem regrettable, if not absolutely subversive: 
 
  
. The first massive intrusion of federal governmental authority in the affairs of individuals and the states, beginning with 
the first and second Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which effectively reduced all but one of the states of the defeated 
Confederacy to the status of conquered provinces and imposed military occupation of those states until the civil popula-
tions re-wrote their state constitutions in a way that satisfied Congress; n3 
  
 
. The first expansion of the category of civil rights recognized and enforced by the federal government, and the first 
limits on other civil rights (free assembly, legislative independence, freedom of the press) since the Alien and Sedition 
Acts; n4 
  
 
  
. Massive and wholesale graft, corruption and fraud in the civil governments erected by federal force in the rebel states; 
and (last but very, very far from least) n5 
  
 
  
. The insertion of race as a political consideration into federal politics, by treating blacks as a "distinct class" to be pro-
tected and assisted. n6 
  
 That these initiatives concluded, by 1877, in almost total failure, is greeted by the political Left with a sense of regret 
for the road-not-then-taken, and on the political Right with a sense of anger that they were ever proposed in the first 
place. So, on the one hand, we have Mark Brandon declaring that: 
 
  
The Constitutional program of the Radicals in Congress - embodied in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments - proposed a fundamental alteration of the order's basic forms and values. Consequently, the Radicals' 
constitutional program supplanted dominant conventional understandings of the meaning of the original Constitution. In 
the process, it rendered that Constitution incoherent. n7 
  
 On the other hand, George P. Fletcher argues that Reconstruction "enacted a second American constitution," that 
American constitutional law really begins with the 14th Amendment, and that only in our own times have we shown the 
willingness to come to grips with the fact that the Republic of 1789 is dead, and long live 1867: n8 
 
  
This constitutional order stands in radical contrast to the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia and amended by the Bill of 
Rights in 1791. It defines membership in the American nation, it brings the principle of equality to the fore, and it initi-
ates the process of extending the franchise to virtually all adult citizens. The original Constitution did none of these 
things. n9 
  
 Is there a better way to look at Reconstruction, which requires neither the repudiation of Reconstruction nor the repu-
diation of the Constitution? Any realistic answer to that question has to begin with a willingness to think about the Civil 
War which preceded it as embodying three pivotal questions: 
1. Can a democracy - or any form of popular government that rests ultimate sovereignty in the consent of the ma-
jority - actually work in the way the Founders planned? Lincoln saw clearly, and from the outset, that the real issue of 
the Civil War was the fragility of democratic process. n10 If political minorities, like the slaveholding South, will always 
withdraw from the polis the moment their will is thwarted, then this is a de facto confession that democracy does not 
really work, after all. Nor was Lincoln the only one. George W. Towle, writing in the Atlantic Monthly in the summer 
of 1864, warned that "the failure of man's self-governing capacity here" must be "the deathblow to its own hopes" eve-
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rywhere else. n11 "Our failure will not be fatal to us alone; it will involve the fate of the millions who are now seeking to 
plant themselves against the tremendous force of kingly and patrician prestige." n12 
2. Can democracy endure alongside slavery? Sooner or later, either recognition of natural rights will correct the 
thinking that justifies slavery and abolish it, or natural rights will wither away and all rights will become dependent on 
whomever the exercise of power is pleased to bestow them. 
3. Can democracy succeed in the face of racial, cultural, linguistic or religious differences? Or, as William 
Grosvenor wrote more bluntly in The New Englander in October 1865, "How shall we deal with four millions of liber-
ated blacks?" n13 Here, of course, is where the business of race intrudes its ugly snout. For in the political environment of 
slavery, blacks of African descent were the only permissible objects of enslavement, and in intellectual environment of 
the 19th century, widespread beliefs in white racial supremacy forbade the integration of blacks and whites on anything 
approximating civic equality. One popular solution was colonization. n14 But this so-called solution collided mightily 
with the fact that the Civil War had put blacks into federal uniform, and made highly questionable the justice of denying 
civil rights to those who had fought to defend the civic order. n15 Still, there was no reason to imagine that racism might 
not prove much stronger than logic. No wonder Grosvenor said, "Rightly considered, it is the most awful problem that 
any nation ever undertook to solve." n16 
Abraham Lincoln's answer to the first question was yes, and so secession had to be resisted; his answer to the sec-
ond was no, and so the United States could not limp on indefinitely "half-slave and half-free." His answer to the third 
question - which is really the question of Reconstruction as much as it is a question of the Civil War - arrived in one 
word: citizen. It was the word Lincoln paid to inscribe on the gravestone of his free black valet, William H. Johnson, 
who died of smallpox in January 1864, smallpox he probably caught from Lincoln, who developed a non-lethal form of 
the disease on his way back from delivering his address at Gettysburg that November. n17 Buried in the Congressional 
cemetery, William Johnson's small white marker bears only his name and that single word, citizen. n18 No one noticed it 
then, but that word is the principle at stake in Reconstruction. 
The Constitution does not offer a particularly useful definition of citizenship; in fact, it does not offer one at all. In 
the five places where the word citizen occurs in the Constitution, three of them are used merely to specify that certain 
officeholders must have been "a Citizen of the United States." n19 The other two discuss the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts over "Controversies... between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects," 
and the "Privileges and Immunities" which "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to" enjoy equally with all those 
of "Citizens in the several States." n20 So it appeared that two parallel categories existed - the category of citizens of the 
United States and the category of citizens of individual states - the first of which the Constitution offered no definition, 
and the second of which it had no power to define. 
This two-track system of federal and state citizenship may have seemed more obvious to the Founders than to us, 
since citizenship, in its classical and liberal forms, has always had a certain two-track aspect anyway. n21 One of those 
aspects is participation: citizenship is what conveys the right to participate in governance and law-making, the contrast 
here being between a citizen who is an agent in self-government and a subject who is merely ruled. A citizen, in this 
sense, is a public person, exercising a public role. n22 The other is status: citizenship is what conveys certain legal protec-
tions and a civic identity. n23 Looked at from this perspective, a citizen is a legal member of the polis, and cannot be mo-
lested by his government or any other government without judicial consequences. n24 And in a rough-and-ready way, 
federal jurisprudence before the Civil War sorted out the boundary between federal and state citizenship precisely along 
the lines of the participation/status dividing line. State citizenship spoke most directly to the rules of civic participation - 
hence, it was not only theoretically but practically possible to exercise certain civil rights, and particularly voting, with-
in the states without being a citizen of the United States. In Lincoln's Illinois, the single requirement for voting was res-
idence in the state for one year, even though the statutory requirement for residence under federal naturalization law was 
five years. n25 Hence, white immigrants who would not be deemed naturalized by the federal government could vote 
legally in Illinois in the 1850s, provided they could swear an oath to a judge of elections that they had been Illinois res-
idents for the previous year. n26 Federal citizenship, however, spoke more clearly to status - it spelled out who could be 
elected, who could sue in federal courts, and to whom "Controversies" between competing state jurisdictions would be 
referred. n27 
Even there, however, the Constitution still did not convey a very adequate notion of what qualified someone to en-
joy the status of federal citizen. The implication of the Constitution, based on the requirement that the president be a 
"natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States," was that federal citizenship was a matter of jus soli, of being 
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born on the national land or soil. n28 But the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford decision of 1857 inserted the requirement of 
jus sanguinis - citizenship by specific birthright - which it then used to deny Dred Scott any standing in the federal 
courts as a man of "African descent." n29 And so did many of the state courts: even free blacks, ruled the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, "cannot be considered as citizens in the largest sense of the term." n30 When South Carolina (in the wake 
of the Denmark Vesey rebellion plot) required incarceration of black sailors on ships visiting Carolina ports, a federal 
district court ruled that this was a violation of the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Constitution. n31 In other 
words, American seamen of whatever race possessed a federal citizenship status which South Carolina could not arbi-
trarily ignore. But this was swept aside by an edict from Andrew Jackson's attorney-general (Roger B. Taney, who 
would also write the majority opinion in Dred Scott): "The African race in the United States even when free ... were not 
looked upon as citizens by the contracting parties who formed the Constitution." n32 
So, it might have been possible, on these terms, to have arrived at the end of the Civil War - to emancipate slaves, 
abolish slavery as a legal institution, and re-unify the nation - and in the process do absolutely nothing about whether 
the newly-emancipated slaves were citizens of anything. Possible - but not likely. By the end of the war, colonization 
had turned out to be a "humbug," and 180,000 free blacks stood in federal uniforms and had earned federal honors for 
their fighting. n33 There was also a political consideration in the minds of the victorious Republican party that urged them 
to establish a definition of citizenship which embraced both status and participation. n34 Practically speaking, the end of 
slavery meant an end to the 3/5ths clause in the Constitution; and far from that being the end of a racial humiliation for 
blacks, what it meant politically was that the Southern states could now return to Congress, demanding full (rather than 
3/5ths) representation for their black population, without actually giving those blacks the right to vote for the 
now-increased representation the South would enjoy. n35 Tactically speaking, it would be possible for the white South to 
emerge from the Civil War in an even stronger position in Congress than it had enjoyed before the war, with blacks still 
disenfranchised, but their numbers now awarding Southern states larger delegations in the House of Representatives. 
The result would be the rolling-back of every initiative the Republicans had achieved in their brief dominance of the 
wartime Congress - protective tariffs, government assistance to the railroads, the homestead act, the national banking 
system - as well as assumption of the Confederate war debt. 
On the other hand, if the freedman could be transitioned from non-citizen to citizen, then (promised Frederick 
Douglass) "he will raise up a party in the Southern States among the poor, who will rally with him," and so establish a 
long-term Republican political hegemony in the formerly all-Democratic South. n36 But this would go for nothing if, 
with the end of hostilities, political pardons were handed out widely to former rebels, allowing them to mobilize their 
old pre-war political resources and get themselves elected to Congress; and if blacks could be confined to a 
no-man's-land where they were no longer slaves but not legally citizens of either the states or the federal Union. Sure 
enough, no sooner had Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and Southern Unionist, been sworn in as president after the 
assassination of Lincoln, than Johnson, on May 29, 1865, issued a broadly-drawn amnesty proclamation, offering par-
dons to all but the uppermost echelons of the former Confederate leadership - and even they were permitted by "special 
application" to be pardoned. n37 And to smooth the path to restoration, Johnson added a series of proclamations, ap-
pointing interim provisional governors and urging the writing of new state constitutions based upon the voter qualifica-
tions in force at the time of secession in 1861 - which meant, in large but invisible letters, no blacks. n38 
What this insured was that Reconstruction would be fought as a struggle over citizenship - in effect, to settle 
whether citizenship could trump race in the same way, at the time of the Founding, it had trumped religion, through the 
First Amendment. So, from the moment it became clear that Andrew Johnson intended nothing more than the 
re-creation of the pre-war status quo, minus only slavery, the Republican congressional leadership - Thaddeus Stevens 
of Pennsylvania in the House, Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts in the Senate - reached over John-
son's hands, first to replace the old Confederate order with a free-labor economy, and then to define citizenship in such a 
way as to secure the freedmen's place within the politics and economy of a new South. n39 
It is a good measure of how critical the notion of citizenship was to Reconstruction that the first resistance the 
ex-Confederates offered took the form, not of the race war that had been so often predicted as the likeliest result of 
emancipation, but of guarding the precincts of participation in the states from black intrusion. n40 The "Black Codes" 
enacted in the wake of Johnson's amnesty proclamation were aimed at defining blacks as "vagrants' or "paupers' who 
could be excluded from citizenship by excessive poll taxes, forbidding black-white intermarriage, curtailments of free 
speech (including "insulting gestures"), and most ominous of all, ownership of "fire-arms of any kind, or any ammuni-
tion, dirk or bowie knife." n41 It also underscores the centrality of the place of citizenship in any discussion of Recon-
struction to notice that the first objections from Republicans, when the first session of the new 39th Congress assembled 
in December 1865, were also based on citizenship. "I deny the right of these States to pass these laws against men who 
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are citizens of the United States," n42 erupted Henry Wilson, seconded by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who introduced a 
Civil Rights bill just after the New Year which contained a forthright definition of federal citizenship, based on jus soli: 
"All persons born in the United States ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States," declared the new bill, 
"and such citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States 
... as is enjoyed by white citizens." n43 Offences against those rights would be adjudicable in federal courts. n44 
But this would require some serious re-negotiating of the assumptions about citizenship which had prevailed up un-
til the Civil War. Wilson was promptly interrupted by John Sherman of Ohio, who pointed out that "there is scarcely a 
State in the Union that does not make distinctions on account of color ... Is it the purpose of this bill to wipe out all these 
distinctions?" n45 And in the House of Representatives, Wisconsin Democrat Charles Eldridge accused the promoters of 
the civil rights bill of an "insidious and dangerous" plan to "lay prostrate at the feet of the Federal Government the judi-
ciary of the States." n46 The only citizenship Eldridge knew was the citizenship of the states: "I hold that the rights of the 
States are the rights of the Union, that the rights of the States and the liberty of the States are essential to the liberty of 
the individual citizen." n47 
Trumbull's civil rights bill was eventually passed in March 1866, but finally stopping short of including among the 
rights of federal citizenship the right to vote. n48 Andrew Johnson vetoed it anyway on March 27th. n49 Granting federal 
citizenship to "our entire colored population" when the states had refused to do likewise in terms of state citizenship, 
argued Johnson, either made federal citizenship null and void, or else overrode state citizenship to the point where it 
was a useless concept. n50 And it was clearly the latter which Johnson saw as the bill's strategy: "Federal law, whenever 
it can be made to apply, displaces State law" and interferes with "relations existing exclusively between a State and its 
citizens." n51 Congress ignored him and overrode the veto. n52 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a landmark in the expansion of the notion of federal citizenship, because it forced 
into the open for the first time since the Constitutional Convention the inherently problematic linkage of the divided 
sovereignty of the states and the Union, and the divided tracks of a citizenship of status and a citizenship of participa-
tion. The argument of Andrew Johnson and the wartime Democrats in Congress implied that state citizenship covered 
virtually every ground worth calling citizenship - office-holding, contract, marriage, and, of course, voting. But what 
this left as the realm of federal citizenship was anyone's guess. The opponents of the civil rights bill and other Recon-
struction legislation were opposing federal jurisdiction over both rights of participation as well as status. If participation 
and status were up to the states to define, was there any worthwhile meaning to the phrase, "citizen of the United 
States'? It had been the plea of Charles Sumner in 1854, in his provocative speech on "The Crime Against Kansas," that 
the crime of Gaius Verres - which had been that he ignored his victim's protest, civis Romanus sum - was not less trea-
sonous than the depredations of pro-slavery Border Ruffians who ignored their victims' protests of "I am an American 
citizen." n53 That plea got Sumner assaulted on the floor of the Senate; those who opposed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 
were, if only metaphorically, doing much the same. n54 
One solution to the deadlock over state and federal citizenship in the former Confederacy was to deny that the 
one-time Confederate states were any longer states of the Union - that they had, in effect, committed state-suicide by 
secession, and were to be governed as the western territories were governed, directly by federal law. n55 In turn, then, 
federal citizenship could assume the burden of defining both status and participation for the inhabitants of the occupied 
Confederacy. This was the strategy behind the two Reconstruction Acts of March and July 1867, which declared that 
"no legal state governments or adequate protection for life or property now exists" in any of the old Confederate states 
except Tennessee and reduced them to "military districts" where "civil tribunals" would operate only at the behest of the 
military district commander. n56 But even before the bills were passed, they were placed under fire from a new quarter, 
the Supreme Court, which released its opinions in Ex parte Milligan in December, 1866. n57 Ex parte Milligan reversed 
the convictions of Lambdin Milligan and two others who had been imprisoned by a federal military tribunal in 1864, 
and thus called into question the entire constitutional legitimacy of military authority. n58 Fearful that "the first time that 
the South with their copperhead allies obtained command of Congress," they would repeal the civil rights bill and ap-
peal to the Court to overturn the Reconstruction Acts, congressional Republicans leapt ahead in the second session of 
the 39th Congress to armor-plate the status of federal citizenship with two amendments to the Constitution, n59 the four-
teenth (which eliminated any distinction between state and federal citizenship and welded them together on the basis of 
jus soli: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside" n60) and the fifteenth in 1869 (which annexed participation to federal 
citizenship by preventing any state or federal authority from denying the right to vote on account "of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude"). n61 This was, as future president James Garfield announced in the House, the first time 
that the federal government "proposes to hold over every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting 
Page 6 
12 Chap. L. Rev. 705, * 
shield of law." n62 Taken together, the Reconstruction amendments cemented firmly into place the basic Republican con-
viction that "no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic, but what arose from merit and conduct." n63 
Although the Democratic opposition raged that the Reconstruction amendments were nothing but what Garret Da-
vis of Kentucky called "a bald, naked attempt to usurp power and to bring all the sovereign and reserved powers of the 
States to the foot of a tyrannical and despotic faction in Congress," and that it gave the vote "to a race of men who 
throughout their whole history, in every country and condition in which they have ever been placed, have demonstrated 
their utter inability for self-government," it was ultimately neither a demonic thirst for centralized government nor an 
idealized passion for racial egalitarianism which were the drivers of that opposition, but the question of citizenship. n64 
Even some of the most radical Republicans were surprisingly uninterested in turning their Reconstruction legislation 
into a social revolution. n65 "This doctrine does not mean that a negro shall sit on the same seat or eat at the same table 
with a white man," Thaddeus Stevens replied in 1867, "that is a matter of taste which every man must decide for him-
self. The law has nothing to do with it." n66 But insofar as the black man born in the United States and the white man 
born in the United States were considered politically equal, their identity was based, not on being black or white, but on 
being citizens. n67 
Unhappily, the history of Reconstruction - like more recent reconstructions - contains within itself a warning that 
bills and amendments do not carry with them guarantees about security. n68 Military reconstruction was pock-marked by 
racial violence in Southern cities, aimed largely at intimidating blacks from voting and restricting them to various forms 
of economic peonage. n69 Congress attempted to contain the violence with the three Force Acts of 1870 and 1871; and 
Ku Klux Klan violence ensured the election of Republican governments in the former Confederate states, and of Ulys-
ses Grant in 1868 and 1872. n70 But by 1876, many of the old wartime Republican guard were gone - Thaddeus Stevens 
died in 1868, Henry Wilson left the Senate in 1872 to run as Grant's vice-president, and died in 1875, and Charles 
Sumner died in 1874. n71 Also gone was the Republican majority in the House, which was replaced in 1874 by the first 
Democratic majority since the beginning of the Civil War, and the Republican majority in the Senate, which was lost in 
the elections of 1878. n72 By then, the full weight of an unsympathetic Supreme Court had finally descended in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, which re-established "that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of the 
State, which are distinct from each other." n73 Hence, the "privileges and immunities" attached to federal citizenship had 
no application to state governments. n74 The second blow came in U.S. v. Cruikshank in 1875, which re-affirmed 
Slaughter-House Cases and added that "the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage up-
on any one, and that the United States have no voters of their own creation in the States." n75 An effort to circumvent 
Cruikshank, in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, lasted only until 1883, when the Supreme Court overturned the 
Act in the Civil Rights Cases. n76 
By that time, even the Republican faithful had lost heart in the fight. The Panic of 1873 pulled the financial rug 
from under the government's resources, and the cries for help from southern blacks for government intervention in-
creasingly came to sound in Republican ears like the demands of populist farmers for currency inflation or unionized 
workers for economic regulation. n77 "Is it not time for the colored race to stop playing the baby?" asked the Chicago 
Tribune irritably in 1875. n78 Finally, the deal struck by the electoral compromise of 1877, which gave the presidency to 
Rutherford B. Hayes and mandated the withdrawal of the last Reconstruction military authorities; in their absence, a 
lethal combination of strong-arm politicking and economic fragility sent the feeble Reconstruction state governments 
crashing down. n79 Not until 1888 would Republicans regain sufficient numbers in Congress to renew their efforts to 
interpose federal supervision of Southern voting with a fresh "Force Bill,” drafted by Henry Cabot Lodge. n80 The bill 
passed the House, only to die a lingering death in the Senate. n81 It had all been, in the memorable title of Judge Albion 
Tourgee's memoir, "A Fool's Errand." n82 
We should not fool ourselves, however, into thinking that this was an unavoidable, much less an appropriate, con-
clusion to Reconstruction. Although Reconstruction has more recently been portrayed as a kind of radical fairy-tale, or a 
Paris Commune in gumbo, Reconstruction's fundamental issue - citizenship, rather than race or centralization, or even 
civil rights - was a profoundly conservative one. n83 The kind of citizenship imagined by the Reconstruction Republicans 
is based on the jus soli and by the rational assent to a series of propositions (starting with the natural rights proposition 
of the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal), not blood, soil, race or ethnicity, the jus sanguinis so 
beloved of German Romanticism. n84 The cry, I am an American citizen, is what must make any power stand down, 
whether it comes in the form of centralized federal governments or (what is no less exempt from the blandishments of 
power) centralized state governments, centralized municipal governments, boss-driven school boards, or one-party fac-
ulties. n85 Writing online for his magazine, The American Interest, Francis Fukuyama has said: 
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Americans traditionally distrust strong central government, and champion a federalism that distributes powers to state 
and local governments. The logic of wanting to move government closer to the people is strong, but we often forget that 
tyranny can be imposed by local oligarchies as much as by centralized ones. In the history of the Anglophone world, it 
is not the ability of local authorities to check the central government, but rather a balance of power between local au-
thorities and a strong central government, that is the true cradle of liberty. n86 
  
    The price we have paid for ignoring this balance lives on not only in the ugly history of poll taxes, literary tests and 
grandfather clauses, but also in the federal overreach with which that history has been responded to, in the form of racial 
gerrymandering and proportional representation schemes. Neither the illness or its maladroit cure - whether local or 
federal - has much to offer beside the fundamental honor of citizenship; and refusing to recognize the implications of 
civis Americanus sum in the era of Reconstruction is what has helped bring us to our present muddled condition over 
voting rights, statistical "triggers," and the racial balkanization of the nation. n87 At the end of the day, there is only one 
political honor any American should aspire to, and only one political privilege that any of us should be permitted to 
enjoy, and it is contained in that singular and laconic word that President Lincoln engraved on William Johnson's head-
stone: CITIZEN. 
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